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formed, which provides that neither of the parties shall sell or
assign his interest without consulting the other parties and giving
them the preference to buy such interest, is not sufficiently indica-
tive of an intention to authorize the introduction of a stranger into
the firm, to overrule the well established law on that subject.
Indeed the complainant nowhere alleges that he became a partner
under the clause referred to. It may have been introduced as a
provision for an earlier dissolution than the term mentioned in the
agreement, but whatever effect the provision may have had between
the parties theinselves, it does not clearly appear to confer on the
complainant those rights which would, in the present case, justify
-the Court in granting the present application.
The motion for an injunction and for the appointment of a re-
ceiver, is therefore refused.
. Fallon for complainant; Mallory, Bull and Sheppard for
respondents.
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Sussex Summer Assizes, 1852.
REG. V. FRANCES MOORE.'
A party cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit Suicide, if, at the time of the
act done, he was so drunk as not to know what he was about.
The prisoner was indicted for a misdemeanor, in attempting to
commit suicide by throwing herself into a well. The only witness
examined stated, that he lived in the same house with the prisoner
and her husband; and, one evening, as they were quarrelling and
beating each other, he, in order to separate them, put the prisoner
out of the house into the garden, where was a well, thirty-eight
feet deep, with about four feet of water. The prisoner then
exclaimed, that as she was thrust out of the house she would throw
herself into the well. She accordingly did so, but help having
been obtained, was taken out without much injury. The witness
116 Jur. 750.
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further said, in answer to a question from the judge, that the
prisoner was at the time so drunk as not to know what she was
about.
JERvIS, C. J., (to the jury).-If the prisoner was so drunk as
not to know what she was about, how can you find that she intended
to destroy herself?- Verdict, not guilty.
- The authorities are rather at variance as to whether, and
under what circumstances, the fact of an accused person havingbcen
drunk at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, may be
taken into consideration by the jury. Perhaps they may be recon-
ciled, by adverting to the distinction taken by foreign jurists between
"delicta facti permanentis," and "delicta facti transeuntis." That
drunkenness is no excuse for crime committed under its influence,
when the crime is one by which mischief is caused to person or
property, is a principle alike of natural and municipal law. In
such cases, it is no answer whatever to the charge that the accused
did the mischievous act without criminal intent, seeing that it
was his own voluntary act which deprived him of the means of
knowing the injury he was doing. The reason of this is thus
clearly stated by Puffendorff,-"Equidem id manifestum, est,
delicto ob ebrietatem, per quam patrato sunt, ideo a pocna haud-
quaquam immunia esse. Scilicet quanquam forte in ebrietate ipsa
quis ignoret, quid agat; tamen ubi quis ultro voluit usurpare illa,
ex buibus obnubilationem mentis orituram norat, censetur etiam
in ea consensisse, qum inde erant consecutura. Quia absolute est
interdictum, delicta admittere, ideo vitandue quoque sunt homini
occasiones, qm probabiliter in delicta possunt pertrahere. Quid
autem ebrietas designot, vix est, ut ignorare quis possit. Et cum
.ipsa ebrietas eo prmcique nomine sit peccatum, quatenus adt alia
peccata hominem disponit; not potest ex peccatorum numero
eximi, quod in se est peccatum ideo, quia peccato suam debet
originem." And in our own law, Sir E. Coke, in a well-known
passage, says,---" As for a drunkard who is voluntarius damnon,
he hath (as hath been said) no privilege thereby, but what hurt
I De Jut. Nat. & Gent., lib. 3, c. 6, 4. 2 Co. Litt. 247. a.
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or ill soever he doth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it: Omne
e-rimen ebrieta8 et incendit, et detegit." But where a party is
charged with a crime, the essence of which is intention, and which
leaves no permanent effects behind it, the fact of his drunkenness
at the time becomes a material element in determining whether
that intention did really exist in his mind or not.-Jurist Reporter.
It is well settled in the United States, that intoxication is no
excuse for the commission of a crime, such as murder.' But
drunkenness may be material upon the question of malice; and
when proved, may lower the grade of the offence, as from mur-
der in the first, to murder in the second degree. 2  So where
there was provocation given, it may be taken into consideration
to determine whether the blow was given upon the provocation
or on an old grudge; and also on the ground of the greater
excitability of a drunken man.3 There may be distinctions taken,
too, among the different stages of intoxication, as that by Swin-
bourne, in his chapter entitled "Of him that is drunk,"'4 between
a man "excessive drunk," and one "not clean spent, albeit his
understanding be troubled."
But to justify the application of the general rule the crime must
take place, and be the immediate result of the fit of intoxication,
and while it lasts. Permanent insanity, though remotely caused
by habitual intemperance, will be, as in other cases, a good
defence.5 In a case in Ohio, indeed, it was said that where-
insanity is produced by intoxication, and the prisoner knew that
IBennett v. The State, Mart. & Yerg. 183; Swan v. State, 4 Hump. 135; Corn-
well v. The State, Mart. & Yerg. 147; U. S. v. Shelmire, 1 Baldw. 371 ; State v.
Turner, Wright's Ohio, 20; State v. Tookey, 2 Rice, S. C. Dig. 105.
2 Kelley v. The State, 3 Sm. & Al. 518; Com. v. Haggerty, Lewis Crim. Law,
405; Penn'a v. McFall, Add. 257; Pirtle v. The State, 9 Hump. 0,63; See R. V.
Gradley, 1 Russ. on Crimes, 8, afterwards, however, denied to be law in Rex V.
Carroll, 7 C. & P. 145.
3 Pirtle v. The State, 9 Hump. 668; R. v. Thomas, 7 C. & P. 817; R. v. Pearson,
2 Lewin, 144; State v. MeCaul, 1 Spear, 181.
4 Wills, p. 2. ch. vi.
5 U. S. v. Drew, 5 Mason. 28; Cornwall v. The State, Martin & Yerg. 155.
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such would be the result, he could not set it up as a defence.'
But this is said to be contrary both to medical and legal autho-
rity.--.Ed. Am. Law Register.
Court of Queen's Bench, Eastern Term, May 4, 1852.
LLOYD V. HENRY OLIVER.'
In an Action by Payee against the Maker of the following Instrument-" Two
Months after Date I promise to pay to T. R. L., or Order, 991. 15s. for Value
received"--in the Corner was the Name of the Plaintiff, and his Acceptance was
written across the instrument:-Held, that it might be treated as a Bill of
Exchange,
Action by Payee against the drawer of a bill of exchange. Plea,
non accepit. On the trial, before Erle, J., at the London Sittings
in this term, the plaintiff gave in evidence the following instru-
ment:-
"991. 15s. "London, July 17, 1851.
"Two months after date I promise to pay to Mr. T. R. Lloyd,
or order, the sum of ninety-nine pounds fifteen shillings, for value
received. " HENRY OLIVER."
"John Edward Oliver, Birmingham."
Across the instrument was written:-
"Accepted, payable Spooner, Attwood & Co., bankers, London.
"EDWARD OLIVER."
The plaintiff, who was called as a witness, stated that he gave
the bill to Henry Oliver to get it accepted, and that he brought it
back with the names of the drawer and acceptor, but with the
words "I promise to pay" interlined. It was contended for the
13 Am. Jur. 10.
2Bost. Med. & Surg. Jour. 568; Wharton's Crim. Law, 47.
s 16 Jur. 833.
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defendant that this was a promissory note, and not a bill of
exchange. The learned judge was of opinion that it might be
declared upon as a bill of exchange; and a verdict was entered
for the plaintiff.
Gray now moved for a rule nisi to enter a nonsuit, or for a new
trial on the ground of misdirection.-In Edis v. Bury, (6 B. & Or.
433,) where the instrument began as this does, Littledale, J., said,
(p. 436), "In order to make this a bill of exchange the words ' I
promise' must be rejected; and those words constitute the essential
difference between a bill of exchange and a promissory note."
[Lord Campbell, C. J.-the decision in that case was only that
the instrument might be treated as a promissory note as against
the maker.] In contemplation of law it must be a bill of exchange
before any acceptance is put upon it. [He also cited Block v.
Bell, (1 Moo. & R. 149).]
LORD CAMPBELL, 0. J.-I am clearly of opinion, that, as against
Henry Oliver, the drawer, this instrument may be treated as a bill
of exchange, and that it might have been so treated even before it
was accepted, because it was directed to John Edward Oliver, and
that must mean that he was requested to pay the money therein
mentioned two months after date. I do not reject the words "I
promise to pay;" they may be considered as expressing what is
implied by law, viz. that the drawer of the bill promises to pay, if
the person to whom it is directed does not pay. This instrument
might also, as against Henry Oliver, be treated as a promissory
note. Such an equivocal instrument as this may, as Lord Ellen-
borough held, be treated either as a bill of exchange or as a
promissory note, as against the person who framed it; and, in the
latter case, the maker of it would not be entitled to notice of dis-
honor, which is all that was decided in Edis v. Bury, (6 B. & Cr.
433).
ERLE, J.-I have no doubt, that, as against the present defend-
ant, this instrument may be treated as a bill of exchange. The
language of it must be taken with reference to the surrounding
circumstances. There is the name of a drawee at the bottom, and
